

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 BONN 01184 01 OF 03 201751Z  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W  
-----084192 201807Z /50

O R 201733Z JAN 78  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5038  
INFO USMISSION USBERLIN  
AMEMBASSY BERLIN  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA  
AMCONSUL STUTTGART

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BONN 01184

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: PEPR TSPA GW CG UR US UK FR  
SUBJECT: RENEWED SOVIET DEMARCHE ON OTRAG

REFS: (A) LONDON 731; (B) BONN 736; (C) STATE 8302;  
(D) STATE 1551; (E) 77 BONN 21309;  
(F) GOODBY-VASEV MEMCON JANUARY 12, 1978 (NOTAL)

BEGIN SUMMARY. REPRESENTATIVES OF THE US, UK AND FRENCH  
EMBASSIES HAVE REACHED AD REF AGREEMENT ON A SLIGHTLY  
MODIFIED TEXT FOR AN ALLIED REPLY TO THE TWO SOVIET  
DEMARCHES ON OTRAG. AT BRITISH REQUEST, THE REPLY  
DENIES THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS TO THE  
MATTER. A BRITISH REQUEST FOR A STATEMENT THAT THIS WAS  
NOT A MATTER ON WHICH THERE WERE GROUNDS FOR CONSULTA-  
TIONS WITH THE SOVIETS WAS NOT ACCEPTED.

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VAN WELL HAS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRG DOES NOT INTEND TO  
REPLY FURTHER TO THE SOVIETS. THE FRENCH AND BRITISH  
EMBASSIES ARE NOT YET READY TO DISCUSS THE PROPOSED  
ALLIED REPLY WITH THE FRG, PREFERRING FIRST TO OBTAIN  
APPROVAL OF THE REVISED DRAFT FROM CAPITALS.

ACTION REQUESTED: APPROVAL OF THE AD REF TEXT IN

PARAGRAPH 12 BELOW AND GUIDANCE ON INTENDED LEVEL OF DELIVERY IN WASHINGTON. END SUMMARY.

1. AT THE QUADRIpartite LUNCHEON ON JANUARY 19, STATE SECRETARY VAN WELL CONFIRMED TO THE ALLIED AMBASSADORS THAT THE FRG DOES NOT INTEND TO MAKE ANY FURTHER REPLY TO THE SOVIET DEMARCHE ON OTRAG. THE AMBASSADORS NOTED THAT THEY WOULD BE CONSULTING ON A PROPOSED ALLIED REPLY. LATER THAT DAY US, UK AND FRENCH EMBASSY REPRESENTATIVES MET TO COMPARE REPORTS OF LAST WEEK'S SOVIET APPROACHES IN THE THREE CAPITALS AND TO CONSIDER POSSIBLE CHANGES IN THE PROPOSED ALLIED RESPONSE.

2. MASSET OF THE FRENCH EMBASSY REPORTED THAT THE DEMARCHE IN PARIS WAS MADE TO FOREIGN MINISTER DE GUIRINGAUD ON JANUARY 12 BY AMBASSADOR CHERVONENKO, WHO SAID HE WANTED TO RAISE THE ISSUE PERSONALLY WITH DE GUIRINGAUD BECAUSE OF THE IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO IT IN MOSCOW. CHERVONENKO DID NOT LEAVE A PAPER, BUT FROM THE FRENCH REPORTING CABLE IT WAS CLEAR THAT HE HAD SPKEN FROM THE SAME TEXTS AS THOSE LEFT WITH THE DEPARTMENT BY VASEV AS NON-PAPERS.

3. AFTER HEARING CHERVONENKO'S PRESENTATION, DE GUIRINGAUD REPLIED THAT THE FRENCH HAD CAREFULLY STUDIED THE DEMARCHE MADE BY THE SOVIETS IN AUGUST. HE STATED  
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THAT FRANCE WAS PERFECTLY CONSCIOUS OF ITS QUADRIpartite RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES. (QUERIED ON THIS POINT, MASSET SAID IT WAS CLEAR FROM HIS TELEGRAM THAT DE GUIRINGAUD HAD NOT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT QUADRIpartite RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES WERE APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE. RATHER, HIS POINT HAD BEEN THAT THE FRENCH WERE AS MINDFUL AS THE SOVIETS OF SUCH RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES AND WERE ALWAYS ALERT TO SEE THAT THEY WERE OBSERVED.)

4. DE GUIRINGAUD STATED THAT THE FRENCH HAD BEEN IN CONSULTATION WITH THEIR BRITISH AND US PARTNERS, AND ALSO WITH THE FRG. THE EXPLANATION RECEIVED HAD BEEN SUCH AS TO ALLAY FRENCH CONCERNS. TO THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE FRENCH, THE OTRAG TESTS HAD UTILIZED MATERIALS SUITABLE ONLY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES, THEIR AIM BEING TO LAUNCH SMALL TELECOMMUNICATIONS SATELLITES. NEVERTHELESS, DE GUIRINGAUD CONTINUED, THE FRENCH WERE FOLLOWING THE MATTER CAREFULLY. THEY WERE ALSO VIGILANT WITH REGARD TO THE RESTRICTIONS ON ARMAMENTS

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W  
-----084448 201813Z /50

O R 201733Z JAN 78  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5039  
INFO USMISSION USBERLIN  
AMEMBASSY BERLIN  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA  
AMCONSUL STUTTGART

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EXDIS

WHICH THE FRG HAD SUBSCRIBED TO IN THE PAST VIS-A-VIS  
THE FRENCH.

5. CHERVONENKO STATED THAT HE WOULD TAKE NOTE OF WHAT  
DE GUIRINGAUD HAD SAID AND REPORT TO MOSCOW. HIS  
GOVERNMENT HAD THE FEELING, HOWEVER, THAT WHAT WAS GOING  
ON IN ZAIRE WAS MORE DANGEROUS THAN PEACEFUL  
ACTIVITIES. DE GUIRINGAUD CONCLUDED WITH THE STATEMENT  
THAT, IF THE SOVIET UNION HAD ANY PROOF THAT THE  
ACTIVITIES WERE OF A NON-PEACEFUL NATURE, HE WOULD BE  
HAPPY TO SEE IT.

6. MASSET RECALLED IN CONNECTION WITH THIS LAST  
STATEMENT THAT DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOODBY HAD  
ALSO INVITED VASEV TO PROVIDE MORE SPECIFIC INFORMATION  
(REF C). US EMBOFFSTATED ON BASIS OF REF (F) THAT VASEV  
HAD SUBSEQUENTLY CALLED GOODBY TO CITE THE DECEMBER 13  
"PENTHOUSE" PRESS RELEASE.

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7. YOUNG (UK) REPORTED THAT, IN LONDON, THE DEMARCHE WAS MADE ON JANUARY 13 BY MINISTER-COUNSELOR SEMENOV TO THE HEAD OF THE EAST EUROPEAN/SOVIET DEPARTMENT (SCOTT). SEMENOV USED THE SAME TEXTS AS VASEV, LEAVING COPIES BEHIND AS "SPEAKING NOTES."

8. SCOTT TOLD SEMENOV THAT A REPLY HAD NOT YET BEEN GIVEN TO THE AUGUST DEMARCHE BECAUSE IT HAD BEEN NECESSARY TO CONSULT OTHER GOVERNMENTS. A BRITISH REPLY HAD BEEN ON THE POINT OF DELIVERY, BUT IT WOULD NOW BE NECESSARY TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE NEW DEMARCHE -- ALTHOUGH AT FIRST SIGHT THE SOVIET SPEAKING NOTES SEEMED TO INCLUDE NO NEW INFORMATION EXCEPT UNCONFIRMED PRESS REPORTS.

9. MASSET SAID THAT HE HAD NO NEW INSTRUCTIONS FOR AN ALLIED RESPONSE. IN COMMENTING ON THE EARLIER AD REF DRAFT (REF E), PARIS HAD ACCEPTED WITH SOME RELUCTANCE THE IDEA OF A COMMON REPLY TO THE AUGUST DEMARCHE BUT HAD INSISTED THAT THE REPLY BE BRIEF AND NEGATIVE. PARIS HAD THUS AGREED TO THE TEXT IN REF (E) WITH A MINOR CHANGE IN THE FIRST SENTENCE TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE FACT THAT THE SOVIETS HAD NOT GIVEN THE FRENCH A PAPER IN AUGUST. MASSET ASSUMED THE SAME SORT OF REPLY WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO PARIS AS THAT PREVIOUSLY AGREED.

10. YOUNG REPORTED THAT LONDON HAD SENT INSTRUCTIONS APPROVING GENERALLY THE EARLIER AD REF REPLY BUT INSISTING THAT TWO POINTS BE ADDED:

-- THAT WE ARE NOT AWARE OF ANY INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS PREVENTING ACTIVITIES SUCH AS THAT  
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OF OTRAG, AND

-- THAT THIS IS NOT A MATTER ON WHICH IT IS PROPER FOR US TO CONSULT WITH THE SOVIETS.

YOUNG DISTRIBUTED A REVISED DRAFT INCORPORATING THOSE TWO POINTS.

11. US AND FRENCH EMBOFFS NOTED THAT THE REFERENCE TO QUADRIpartite RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS IN THE PREVIOUS DRAFT HAD BEEN

INSERTED IN A MANNER WHICH WOULD IMPLY THAT WE ARE NOT CONVINCED THAT THESE WERE APPLICABLE TO THE PRESENT CASE. NEVERTHELESS, THEY AGREED TO GO FURTHER IN THE DIRECTION DESIRED BY LONDON BY INSERTING A MORE SPECIFIC DENIAL OF THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS. NEITHER THE US REP NOR MASSET, HOWEVER, WAS WILLING TO RECOMMEND THE SECOND POINT DESIRED BY LONDON. THEY BOTH FELT THAT THE ADDITION OF SUCH A STATEMENT TO A REPLY WHICH WAS ALREADY TOTALLY NEGATIVE WOULD MAKE THE RESPONSE UNNECESSARILY ABRUPT. IN ADDITION, THE US REP THOUGHT THERE WAS A CERTAIN LOGICAL INCONSISTENCY IN TELLING THE SOVIETS THAT CONSULTATIONS IN THE MATTER WERE IMPROPER, AFTER ALLIED OFFICIALS HAD ON TWO OCCASIONS HEARD OUT THE SOVIET DEMARCHES AND AGREED TO CONSIDER THEM.

12. AD REF AGREEMENT WAS EVENTUALLY REACHED ON THE FOLLOWING REVISED ALLIED REPLY:

BEGIN TEXT

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W  
-----084367 201808Z /50

O R 201733Z JAN 78  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5040  
INFO USMISSION USBERLIN  
AMEMBASSY BERLIN  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA  
AMCONSUL STUTTGART

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I WISH TO REFER TO THE SOVIET STATEMENTS OF

AUGUST 22, 1977, AND JANUARY 11, 1978. ON BOTH OCCASIONS YOU INFORMED US OF DEMARCHES WHICH YOUR GOVERNMENT HAS MADE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FRG WITH REGARD TO THE OTRAG ROCKET TESTING FACILITY IN ZAIRE.

WE HAVE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED THE MATTERS RAISED IN YOUR STATEMENTS, INCLUDING THE REFERENCES TO QUADRIPARTITE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES AND TO "KNOWN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS," IN CONSULTATION WITH THE GOVERNMENTS OF FRANCE AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, WHICH WERE SIMILARLY APPROACHED BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT. WE HAVE ALSO CONSULTED THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FRG.

IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FRG HAS RESPONDED TO THE INQUIRIES POSED BY YOUR GOVERNMENT. WE FOR OUR PART ARE SATISFIED THAT NO  
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GROUND'S EXIST FOR THE CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT. NOR ARE WE AWARE OF ANY INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS RELEVANT TO THIS MATTER.

END TEXT

13. BOTH YOUNG AND MASSET CONSIDERED IT NECESSARY TO REFER THE AD REF TEXT TO CAPITALS BEFORE DISCUSSING IT WITH THE FRG -- YOUNG IN PARTICULAR, AS SHE WAS NOT AT ALL CERTAIN THAT LONDON WOULD AGREE TO OMISSION OF THE DESIRED STATEMENT ON THE IMPROPRIETY OF CONSULTING WITH THE SOVIETS ON THE MATTER. MASSET ALSO ARGUED STRONGLY FOR SIMPLY PROVIDING THE FRG WITH A COPY OF THE PROPOSED ALLIED REPLY, ONCE IT HAS BEEN APPROVED IN CAPITALS, RATHER THAN ENTERING INTO CONSULTATIONS WITH THE FRG. US REP NOTED THAT THE FRG HAD BEEN LED TO BELIEVE THAT THERE WOULD BE CONSULTATIONS ON THE ALLIED RESPONSE, TO WHICH MASSET POINTED OUT THAT THE FRG HAD NOT COME TO THE ALLIES BEFORE REPLYING TO THE SOVIETS. HE EXPECTED THAT PARIS WOULD CONSIDER IT ADEQUATE SIMPLY TO INFORM THE FOREIGN OFFICE OF WHAT WE INTENDED TO SAY, THOUGH IT WOULD BE PROPER TO WAIT A DECENT INTERVAL TO GIVE THE FRG AN OPPORTUNITY TO REACT. (IN THE BRITISH AND FRENCH EMBASSIES THE MATTER IS BEING HANDLED BY POL/MIL OFFICERS RATHER THAN BONN GROUP REPS.)

14. ON MODALITIES FOR DELIVERY, IT WAS AGREED TO RECOMMEND THAT THE REPLIES BE GIVEN ORALLY TO SOVIET OFFICIALS IN THE THREE CAPITALS AT THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OR DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY LEVEL. MASSET ASSUMED THAT THE QUAI WOULD NOT HAND OVER A

WRITTEN TEXT, WHEREAS THE US AND UK REPS ASSUMED THAT

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THIS MIGHT BE DONE IN WASHINGTON AND LONDON. NO  
RECOMMENDATIONS ON TIMING WERE MADE, PENDING REACTIONS  
FROM CAPITALS TO THE REVISED DRAFT.

15. COMMENT: WE BELIEVE THAT THE ABOVE DRAFT  
ADEQUATELY MAKES THE POINT THAT QUADRIpartite RIGHTS  
AND RESPONSIBILITIES ARE NOT INVOLVED WITHOUT GOING  
FURTHER TO STATE THAT CONSULTATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS  
ARE THEREFORE IMPROPER. IN CASE LONDON CONTINUES TO  
INSIST, HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE  
CONTINGENCY GUIDANCE ON ACCEPTABILITY OF THE ADDITIONAL  
STATEMENT. GUIDANCE WOULD ALSO BE APPRECIATED ON  
WHETHER THE DEPARTMENT WOULD BE PREPARED TO MOVE  
AHEAD WITH SIMILAR BUT NON-IDENTICAL REPLIES, IF  
FURTHER ATTEMPTS AT COORDINATION WOULD AGAIN DELAY THE  
REPLY.

16. ACTION REQUESTED: (A) APPROVAL OF THE AD REF TEXT  
IN PARA 12; (B) GUIDANCE ON LEVEL OF DELIVERY OF THE  
REPLY IN WASHINGTON; AND (C) GUIDANCE ON POINTS RAISED  
IN PARA 15 ABOVE.  
STOESSEL

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## Message Attributes

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**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 20 jan 1978  
**Decaption Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
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**Enclosure:** n/a  
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**Subject:** RENEWED SOVIET DEMARCHE ON OTRAG  
**TAGS:** PEPR, TSPA, GE, CG, UR, US, UK, FR, OTRAG  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
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**Review Markings:**  
Sheryl P. Walter  
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**Markings:** Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014